The Tripartite Soul in the Republic

The following was a paper I turned in for class. There are footnotes, but they don't copy over for whatever reason. 

Socrates argues that the soul has three parts, the appetite, the spirit, and reason. “Part” refers to a faculty that moves us to act. Since there are movements of the human soul that desire contradictory things, the origins of those desires must therefore be distinct. He argues for this by first putting forth the principle of noncontradiction when he says a thing cannot want or do contradictory things. If the soul wanted to do something contradictory, like to drink and not to drink, then we would be dealing with something else other than a whole unified soul. We would be dealing with some part of the soul instead. In further establishing this approach, Socrates deals with some possible counter examples, such as a moving man or a spinning top. In the case of a man who may move his arms and legs, this is dealt with by distinguishing the parts of the man which move, which wouldn’t violate the law of noncontradiction since it is not the same parts which do contradictory things. Similarly, with a spinning top, the axis may not move, while the circumference does, and as axis and circumference are considered different parts of the top, it doesn’t count as a counterexample to the law of noncontradiction. Socrates wishes to take this as a strategy for any other counter example which may arise. So the law of noncontradiction is established as a method of approach. 

Now, it seems obvious that we have appetites, and Socrates cites thirst as an example. However, there are times when a thirsty man may fight against his appetites and not consume drink. So while our appetites impel us towards meeting some desire, there is at the same time another force which impels it's contradictory act. What then accounts for this apparent contradiction? Because a soul cannot have contradictory urges, we must therefore be dealing with a part of the soul other than the appetite. 

What is it that is in conflict with the appetites in this regard? In Socrates example of thirst, he had in mind one who had been infected with rabies, which inflames thirst. However, since it was understood that thirst makes the rabies worse, reason overrides the appetites and one refrains from drinking. Since it is able to control the appetites, and it does so through evaluation and calculation, it is the faculty of reason. It is something to which it can give assent to or not give assent to, and so is distinct from the appetites. So reason and appetites are distinct. 

Socrates next considers spirit, that is that which gives rise to anger. Socrates distinguishes this from appetites when he cites the story of Leontius looking upon dead bodies. Leontius has an appetitive desire to look at corpses. When he consummates that desire, he expresses anger at allowing his appetitive faculties for going contrary to and overpowering the faculty of reason. So what accounts for this apparent contradiction of wanting to look and also not wanting to look? Since spirit impells Leontius to not look while his appetite impells him to look, they are therefore distinct faculties, and so the contradiction goes away. 

Is spirit distinct from reason then? While Socrates believes that spirit always aligns itself with reason, nonetheless, it is still subject to reason. If spirit is subject to reason, then it must be distinct from reason. Since spirit is informed by reason, it can never go against reason, which is why Socrates thinks they can not be in conflict either. Further, Socrates points out that since infants and animals do not have reason, but they do have spirits, they must therefore be distinct.

I think Socrates was on the right track, and so some objections, like reason is the slave of the passions, hold no water. That we can go against what our passions desire should suffice as a counterexample, but suppose it were true that reason was the slave of the passions, that is, reason, the calculating power of assessment, is subject to passions. This means that reason is not a reliable faculty. An unreliable faculty by which we determine what is true and what is not means we could not know what is true and what is not, and so we could not reliably know anything, much less the proposition that reason is a slave of the passions. This seems only possible if reason was not a slave of the passions, which is contradictory to the original claim. 

That being said, I do have an issue with his justification of spirit being distinct from reason. I do think that infants do have the faculty of reason, because by its nature infants do have that faculty since the essence of a human is to be a rational animal. I will concede that the faculty is not fully developed in infants, but it is nonetheless present. Further, Socrates seems to argue that spirit cannot go contrary to reason because reason informs spirit. However, if there is nothing to inform spirit in babies or animals, then how does spirit act? It doesn't seem like it can. Perhaps he thinks that in the absence of reason it is then informed by appetites, which I think is a plausible account, but that view isn't made clear in the text.