Metaphysics Final Study Guide
The following was my a study guide I typed out for my Metaphysics final exam.
The Indispensability Argument
Quine - On What There Is
What is the problem that Quine is addressing?
The problem that Quine is addressing is the problem of referring to things that do not exist. How can one sensibly say that Pegasus does not exist? Of what is one speaking of if Pegasus does not really exist? If Pegasus does not exist, the word “Pegasus” doesn’t pick anything out. Non-being in some sense must be, otherwise, what is there that is not? One wants to say the things Jim says exist do not actually exist, but I cannot admit there are things that Jim accepts as existing that don’t exist. Otherwise I am talking about them as things.
What is Quine’s use of Russell’s theory of definite descriptions to address the problems?
Quine uses Russell’s theory of definite descriptions to rephrase “Pegasus” as the description “the winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon” and following Russell’s theory, express “Pegasus is not” as “Each thing fails to be winged, a horse, and captured by Bellerophon or more than one thing is winged, a horse, and captured by Bellerophon.” What this does is make named be meaningful without having them denote or pick out anything. Names would not be an indication of ontological commitment.
What is Quine’s criterion of Ontological Commitment?
Quine’s criterion of Ontological Commitment states that to be is, purely and simply, to be the value of a bond variable.
What is the usefulness of Quine’s criterion?
Gives us a precise criterion of ontological commitment
What is the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument and what are the 4 key premises?
The indispensability argument is the claim the argument that concludes we are committed to the existence of mathematical objects. The four key premises are
1) Quine’s Criterion
2) Theory Naturalism
3) The Indispensability Thesis
4) Confirmational Holism
5) Therefore, we are committed to the existence of mathematical objects.
Quine’s Criterion tells us when we commit ourselves to the existence of something when we come to accept a thing. Theory Naturalism states that we accept our best scientific theories as true. The indispensability thesis states that our best scientific theories say there are numbers. Confirmational Holism states that evidence for scientific theory confers justification on the theory as a whole, and not separately on the individual components of the theory.
What are some responses to the argument?
Some responses to the argument are to deny Quine’s criterion by saying we could accept some special predicate, such as “is causally efficacious” or “is located in space-time.” One could reject theory naturalism by outright rejecting naturalism. One could reject or restrict confirmational holism by saying that justification is not holistically conferred on all parts of our theories. This doesn’t square well with scientific practice and it would difficult to not also confirm pseudo-scientific theories that cannot be falsified.
Parsons - Referring to Non-Existent Objects
How does linguistic usage support Parsons view?
Parson’s view is that non-existent objects should be accepted. Linguistic behavior suggest that we understand the difference between referring to something that doesn’t exist and failing to refer to something at all. Doorway example.
Explain Parsons account of Non-Existent objects and his distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear properties, that is, his principles concerning nuclear properties.
For Parson’s any existing object has at least one property that that no other object has, and it follows from this that for any existing object, there must be a set of properties, and for any set of properties, there must be a correlating object. So since non-existent objects still have a set of properties, if we accept the set we also have to accept the correlating object. However, for real existent objects, members of the set do cease, that is to say, they are finite. But the same is not true of non-existent objects. Existent objects are complete but many non-existent objects are incomplete. Nuclear properties are sets of properties that defines an object, like a triangle would have the property of being 3-sided. Non-nuclear properties are properties that an object may have but need not for it to be the kind of thing it is, like a triangle being isosceles.
Explain Parsons remarks on Incompleteness and The Existing Gold Mountain
Parsons says many non-existent objects are incomplete. An object is complete iff it is the case that for every nuclear property it is the case that the object has it or does not have it. So many non-existent objects just don’t say whether they have that property or not. The existing gold mountain would lack completeness, but it still an object, just an unreal object.
Material Constitution
Wiggins - On Being on the Same Place at the Same Time
What is the principle Wiggins is trying to preserve?
The principle Wiggins is trying to preserve is that two things cannot be in the same place at the same time.
What are the counter examples to this principle? (Tree/Molecules & Statue/Copper)
Suppose you had a tree considered as T and W where T is a (leafless) tree and W is the wood that composes the tree. So T and W both occupy the same space at the same time. This is a problem since T and W are not identical since they have difference persistence and survival conditions. For suppose that the tree is cut down to build a house, W persists but not T, or suppose the tree is pruned, then T persists but not W. The same could be said about a copper statue. The copper can be molded into many shapes and sizes, and so the copper would persist, but the statue which is made up of the copper would not.
What is Wiggins solution?
Wiggins solution is to modify the principle and say that no two things of the same kind that satisfy the same substance concept can occupy exactly the same place at the same time. So in the case of the tree, T and W fall under different substance concepts.
How does Geach’s example of Tibbles the Cat present a problem for this solution and what is Wiggins response?
Tibbles the cat presents a problem because at two different times, people have picked out two different things, this particular cat with a tail and this particular cat without a tail. But then suppose the cat loses his tail, and the sits on the mat. Are both cats there or just one? This is a problem because the experiment does not violate the principle nor the revised principle, yet it is difficult to discern the answer. Wiggins solution is to ask whether the cat has a tail or not, and to ask to discover whether this sense of have is proprietary or in some other way unordinary.
Burke - Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper
What is the principle at stake and what is the counterexample?
The principle at stake is the principle that there should be one thing to a place, and the counterexample is that of the copper statue, that they coincide. Copper statues coincide statues and copper like humans coincide with bodies.
What is Burke’s objection to Wiggins solution?
Burke’s objection to Wiggins solution is that there is no way to distinguish between copper and statue if they are qualitatively identical. If there is a qualitative identity of these objects, what explains their alleged difference in sort? In virtue of what does the object ‘statue’ satisfy ‘statue’ and in virtue of what does ‘copper’ satisfy ‘copper’?
Independent & Necessary Being
Rowe - The Cosmological Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
What are the parts of the argument?
There are two parts to the cosmological argument. First is an argument that establishes the existence of a necessary being. The second is an argument that establishes that this necessary being is God.
What are the key premises of the first part of the argument?
The key premises of the first part of the argument are 1) whatever exists is either a dependent or independent being and 2) it is false that every being is dependent.
What is the justification for the premise “It is false that every being is dependent”?
Suppose everything is dependent. Then the collection of every being that exists or did exist is infinite, because otherwise the world would be 1) an independent being in the collection or 2) there would be a circle of causes. One cannot say that the explanation lies in the causal efficacy of something inside the collection for that would violate the supposition, nor could the explanation of the existence of the collection lie in the causal efficacy of something outside the collection because the collection is supposed to be all inclusive.
What is the difference between Strong PSR and Weak PSR?
Strong PSR states that whatever exists must have an explanation for its existence and the Weak PSR states that whatever comes into existence must have an explanation. So an eternal universe wouldn’t need an explanation under the WPSR but would under the SPSR.
What is the role of the SPSR in the cosmological argument?
The role of the SPSR is to provide justification of the first premise that whatever exists is either dependent or independent.
Anselm and Malcom
What is the standard account of Anselm’s Ontological Argument?
God is that which a greater cannot be conceived
Something greater than which cannot be conceived exists in the understanding
To exist in reality is greater than to exist in the understanding alone
If God exists in the understanding alone, then God would not be that than which a greater cannot be conceived
So God exists in reality as well as the understanding
What is Guanilo’s response? (The lost island)
Guanilo’s response is to say that we can run the same argument for a Lost Island. The Lost island is that which no greater can be conceived, and running through the same premises, the Lost Island would also have to exist, for this and perhaps many other entities, which would be an absurd result.
What is the 2nd argument that Anselm presents concerning God’s existence being necessary?
God either exists or doesn’t exist
If God (that than which no greater can be conceived) does not exist, then He cannot come into existence
If God cannot come into existence and God does not exist, then God’s existence is impossible
If God does not exist, then He cannot have come into existence or cease to exist
If God exists and did not come into existence or cease to exist, then God’s existence is necessary
So God’s existence is necessary or impossible
God’s existence is only impossible if there is something contradictory in the concept of such a being
If there is nothing contradictory, then God’s existence is necessary
Free Will
Peter van Inwagen - The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom
What is the difference between negative and positive freedom?
Negative freedom states that freedom is freedom from constraints, such as economic freedom, political freedom, and the like. Positive freedom is what is expressed by the english word “can”.
Why is metaphysical freedom incompatible with determinism?
Metaphysical freedom is incompatible with determinism because if the laws of nature are deterministic, we are free to do only what we in fact do. So if we are free to add to the past, but our additions to the past can only conform to the laws of nature and the laws of nature are deterministic, then we are unable to do otherwise, and being unable to do otherwise negates the “can” of positive freedom.
Why is metaphysical freedom incompatible with indeterminism?
If the laws of nature are indeterministic, then the future is left up to chance. But if it is left up to chance, then we don’t have say either in how we act. Since no one wants to call chance a kind of freedom, freedom is incompatible with indeterminism.
What are van Inwagen’s two suggestions for addressing the problem?
Inwagens two suggestions are to say that despite our strong belief that we are metaphysically free, we are wrong, or to say that we are hardwired to be unable to dispel the mystery of metaphysical freedom.
Frankfurt - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Explain Hume’s compatibilism and two objections to it.
Hume’s compatibilism states that an action is performed freely when the person performing it could have done otherwise if they had wanted to. One objection to this account are compulsive disorders such as kleptomania. If the person wanted not to steal then they wouldn’t have, but this doesn’t square well with our understandings of these disorders. Another objection states that if you were locked in a room and didn’t know it, but wanted to stay anyways, it wouldn’t have mattered. You happened not to want to do otherwise, but you didn’t know that you couldn’t act on it otherwise. This seems to be the wrong result as well.
What is Frankfurt’s view?
Frankfurt’s view distinguishes between 1st and 2nd order desires. 1st Order Desires are ordinary desires as we usually conceive them, such as the desire to have a sandwich, the desire to do dishes, the desire to clean the house. 2nd Order desires are desires about desires, such as the desire to have a desire for a sandwich (maybe you are sick and need food for energy though nothing is appetizing), the desire to have the desire to wash the dishes and clean the house (maybe your wife isn’t upset at you because you didn’t do your chores but because you don’t even desire to do the chores, so to make her happy, you desire the desire for such chores). Frankfurt is concerned with those desires that we wish to be effective, which he calls “volitions”. So if a person has 2nd order volitions, then that person exercises freedom of the will.
How does Frankfurt’s view deal with the objections to Hume’s view?
In the case of the addict or the kleptomaniac, a person may have a desire to steal but if they have a second order volition to not steal, then they are free. Or if a person is a willing addict and has a second order volition to steal and steal anyway, they are also free. In the case of the locked room, so long as the person locked in the room has second order desire to stay, and that desire is volitional, then that person is also free.
What are some other benefits of the view?
Some benefits of the view is that it accounts for disinclination not ascribe free will to animals, it accounts for why freedom of the will is a good thing, it accounts for our intuitions concerning moral responsibility and it is compatible with determinism.
Frankfurt - Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibilities
What is the principle of Alternate Possibilities?
The principle of Alternate Possibilities states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise, and this seems obvious in classic cases of coercion.
How does the modified Jone’s example a counterexample to the above principle?
The modified Jones example, which states that if Black forces Jones to do X, so that Jones couldn’t have done otherwise, but Jones decided to do X anyway based on an earlier decision to do X, this would show that he is still morally responsible even though he could not have done otherwise.
What is the impact of this result on the relationship between Freedom of the will and moral responsibility?
What this shows is that we can have determinism and moral responsibility, since those two are often thought to be incompatible. What matters is not “Could Jones have done otherwise” but what does matter is whether his character/reasons that he came up with is the source of his conclusion.
Time Travel
What is Lewis’ way of conceiving time travel?
Lewis’ way of conceiving time travel involve a distinction between personal time and external time. Personal time is like wristwatch time, that is, measurements through the typical stages of a person (infant-teen-adult-elderly). This isn’t time as we usually understand it, but it plays the same role in the time travelers life that time plays for the common person. Time travel means that there isn’t a 1:1 correlation between the two. It would no longer be true that 1 second in personal time would also equal 1 second in external time. It may be greater or lesser, and so the person would have traveled through time.
What are the issues concerning time travel discussed in class and Lewis’ responses to
Personal Identity
The issue concerning personal identity is shown when supposing you went back in time and you talked to yourself. We should ask, which is you? Lewis’ response would be to appeal to 4D, and that what unites us is our mental continuity and bodily continuity with the right causal connections. So it wouldn’t be quite right to say that the whole of him is in two places at once since neither of the two stages are the whole of him.
Causal Loops
The problem with causal loops is seen when we consider that a time travel goes back in time and tells his younger self how to build the time machine. This would only be known because it was told to the older time traveler earlier in his life, which doesn’t explain where the info came from. Lewis responds by saying there is simply no answer, that the parts of the loop are explained but the whole of it is not, and that’s okay since we take other things, like the decay of a tritium atom as being uncaused and inexplicable.
Grandfather Paradoxes (multiple senses of “can”)
The problem here arises when we wonder if the time travel could go back in time and kill his own grandfather before he had any children so that the grandchild would have never been born. But then if he were never to be born, he wouldn’t be able to kill his grandfather, yet there he is. Lewis responds by saying there are different senses of the word “can”. The use of “can” is context sensitive, and possible worlds would help explain this. So for example, I can speak Spanish, that is, it is logically possible that in some world I speak English, there is no contradiction there, but as it so happens, I can’t speak Spanish in the actual world. So one can kill his grandfather because he has what it takes, proficient shooting skills for example, but just doesn’t, and another sense is that he doesn’t because it’s logically impossible to change the past.
The Indispensability Argument
Quine - On What There Is
What is the problem that Quine is addressing?
The problem that Quine is addressing is the problem of referring to things that do not exist. How can one sensibly say that Pegasus does not exist? Of what is one speaking of if Pegasus does not really exist? If Pegasus does not exist, the word “Pegasus” doesn’t pick anything out. Non-being in some sense must be, otherwise, what is there that is not? One wants to say the things Jim says exist do not actually exist, but I cannot admit there are things that Jim accepts as existing that don’t exist. Otherwise I am talking about them as things.
What is Quine’s use of Russell’s theory of definite descriptions to address the problems?
Quine uses Russell’s theory of definite descriptions to rephrase “Pegasus” as the description “the winged horse that was captured by Bellerophon” and following Russell’s theory, express “Pegasus is not” as “Each thing fails to be winged, a horse, and captured by Bellerophon or more than one thing is winged, a horse, and captured by Bellerophon.” What this does is make named be meaningful without having them denote or pick out anything. Names would not be an indication of ontological commitment.
What is Quine’s criterion of Ontological Commitment?
Quine’s criterion of Ontological Commitment states that to be is, purely and simply, to be the value of a bond variable.
What is the usefulness of Quine’s criterion?
Gives us a precise criterion of ontological commitment
What is the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument and what are the 4 key premises?
The indispensability argument is the claim the argument that concludes we are committed to the existence of mathematical objects. The four key premises are
1) Quine’s Criterion
2) Theory Naturalism
3) The Indispensability Thesis
4) Confirmational Holism
5) Therefore, we are committed to the existence of mathematical objects.
Quine’s Criterion tells us when we commit ourselves to the existence of something when we come to accept a thing. Theory Naturalism states that we accept our best scientific theories as true. The indispensability thesis states that our best scientific theories say there are numbers. Confirmational Holism states that evidence for scientific theory confers justification on the theory as a whole, and not separately on the individual components of the theory.
What are some responses to the argument?
Some responses to the argument are to deny Quine’s criterion by saying we could accept some special predicate, such as “is causally efficacious” or “is located in space-time.” One could reject theory naturalism by outright rejecting naturalism. One could reject or restrict confirmational holism by saying that justification is not holistically conferred on all parts of our theories. This doesn’t square well with scientific practice and it would difficult to not also confirm pseudo-scientific theories that cannot be falsified.
Parsons - Referring to Non-Existent Objects
How does linguistic usage support Parsons view?
Parson’s view is that non-existent objects should be accepted. Linguistic behavior suggest that we understand the difference between referring to something that doesn’t exist and failing to refer to something at all. Doorway example.
Explain Parsons account of Non-Existent objects and his distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear properties, that is, his principles concerning nuclear properties.
For Parson’s any existing object has at least one property that that no other object has, and it follows from this that for any existing object, there must be a set of properties, and for any set of properties, there must be a correlating object. So since non-existent objects still have a set of properties, if we accept the set we also have to accept the correlating object. However, for real existent objects, members of the set do cease, that is to say, they are finite. But the same is not true of non-existent objects. Existent objects are complete but many non-existent objects are incomplete. Nuclear properties are sets of properties that defines an object, like a triangle would have the property of being 3-sided. Non-nuclear properties are properties that an object may have but need not for it to be the kind of thing it is, like a triangle being isosceles.
Explain Parsons remarks on Incompleteness and The Existing Gold Mountain
Parsons says many non-existent objects are incomplete. An object is complete iff it is the case that for every nuclear property it is the case that the object has it or does not have it. So many non-existent objects just don’t say whether they have that property or not. The existing gold mountain would lack completeness, but it still an object, just an unreal object.
Material Constitution
Wiggins - On Being on the Same Place at the Same Time
What is the principle Wiggins is trying to preserve?
The principle Wiggins is trying to preserve is that two things cannot be in the same place at the same time.
What are the counter examples to this principle? (Tree/Molecules & Statue/Copper)
Suppose you had a tree considered as T and W where T is a (leafless) tree and W is the wood that composes the tree. So T and W both occupy the same space at the same time. This is a problem since T and W are not identical since they have difference persistence and survival conditions. For suppose that the tree is cut down to build a house, W persists but not T, or suppose the tree is pruned, then T persists but not W. The same could be said about a copper statue. The copper can be molded into many shapes and sizes, and so the copper would persist, but the statue which is made up of the copper would not.
What is Wiggins solution?
Wiggins solution is to modify the principle and say that no two things of the same kind that satisfy the same substance concept can occupy exactly the same place at the same time. So in the case of the tree, T and W fall under different substance concepts.
How does Geach’s example of Tibbles the Cat present a problem for this solution and what is Wiggins response?
Tibbles the cat presents a problem because at two different times, people have picked out two different things, this particular cat with a tail and this particular cat without a tail. But then suppose the cat loses his tail, and the sits on the mat. Are both cats there or just one? This is a problem because the experiment does not violate the principle nor the revised principle, yet it is difficult to discern the answer. Wiggins solution is to ask whether the cat has a tail or not, and to ask to discover whether this sense of have is proprietary or in some other way unordinary.
Burke - Copper Statues and Pieces of Copper
What is the principle at stake and what is the counterexample?
The principle at stake is the principle that there should be one thing to a place, and the counterexample is that of the copper statue, that they coincide. Copper statues coincide statues and copper like humans coincide with bodies.
What is Burke’s objection to Wiggins solution?
Burke’s objection to Wiggins solution is that there is no way to distinguish between copper and statue if they are qualitatively identical. If there is a qualitative identity of these objects, what explains their alleged difference in sort? In virtue of what does the object ‘statue’ satisfy ‘statue’ and in virtue of what does ‘copper’ satisfy ‘copper’?
Independent & Necessary Being
Rowe - The Cosmological Argument and the Principle of Sufficient Reason
What are the parts of the argument?
There are two parts to the cosmological argument. First is an argument that establishes the existence of a necessary being. The second is an argument that establishes that this necessary being is God.
What are the key premises of the first part of the argument?
The key premises of the first part of the argument are 1) whatever exists is either a dependent or independent being and 2) it is false that every being is dependent.
What is the justification for the premise “It is false that every being is dependent”?
Suppose everything is dependent. Then the collection of every being that exists or did exist is infinite, because otherwise the world would be 1) an independent being in the collection or 2) there would be a circle of causes. One cannot say that the explanation lies in the causal efficacy of something inside the collection for that would violate the supposition, nor could the explanation of the existence of the collection lie in the causal efficacy of something outside the collection because the collection is supposed to be all inclusive.
What is the difference between Strong PSR and Weak PSR?
Strong PSR states that whatever exists must have an explanation for its existence and the Weak PSR states that whatever comes into existence must have an explanation. So an eternal universe wouldn’t need an explanation under the WPSR but would under the SPSR.
What is the role of the SPSR in the cosmological argument?
The role of the SPSR is to provide justification of the first premise that whatever exists is either dependent or independent.
Anselm and Malcom
What is the standard account of Anselm’s Ontological Argument?
God is that which a greater cannot be conceived
Something greater than which cannot be conceived exists in the understanding
To exist in reality is greater than to exist in the understanding alone
If God exists in the understanding alone, then God would not be that than which a greater cannot be conceived
So God exists in reality as well as the understanding
What is Guanilo’s response? (The lost island)
Guanilo’s response is to say that we can run the same argument for a Lost Island. The Lost island is that which no greater can be conceived, and running through the same premises, the Lost Island would also have to exist, for this and perhaps many other entities, which would be an absurd result.
What is the 2nd argument that Anselm presents concerning God’s existence being necessary?
God either exists or doesn’t exist
If God (that than which no greater can be conceived) does not exist, then He cannot come into existence
If God cannot come into existence and God does not exist, then God’s existence is impossible
If God does not exist, then He cannot have come into existence or cease to exist
If God exists and did not come into existence or cease to exist, then God’s existence is necessary
So God’s existence is necessary or impossible
God’s existence is only impossible if there is something contradictory in the concept of such a being
If there is nothing contradictory, then God’s existence is necessary
Free Will
Peter van Inwagen - The Mystery of Metaphysical Freedom
What is the difference between negative and positive freedom?
Negative freedom states that freedom is freedom from constraints, such as economic freedom, political freedom, and the like. Positive freedom is what is expressed by the english word “can”.
Why is metaphysical freedom incompatible with determinism?
Metaphysical freedom is incompatible with determinism because if the laws of nature are deterministic, we are free to do only what we in fact do. So if we are free to add to the past, but our additions to the past can only conform to the laws of nature and the laws of nature are deterministic, then we are unable to do otherwise, and being unable to do otherwise negates the “can” of positive freedom.
Why is metaphysical freedom incompatible with indeterminism?
If the laws of nature are indeterministic, then the future is left up to chance. But if it is left up to chance, then we don’t have say either in how we act. Since no one wants to call chance a kind of freedom, freedom is incompatible with indeterminism.
What are van Inwagen’s two suggestions for addressing the problem?
Inwagens two suggestions are to say that despite our strong belief that we are metaphysically free, we are wrong, or to say that we are hardwired to be unable to dispel the mystery of metaphysical freedom.
Frankfurt - Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person
Explain Hume’s compatibilism and two objections to it.
Hume’s compatibilism states that an action is performed freely when the person performing it could have done otherwise if they had wanted to. One objection to this account are compulsive disorders such as kleptomania. If the person wanted not to steal then they wouldn’t have, but this doesn’t square well with our understandings of these disorders. Another objection states that if you were locked in a room and didn’t know it, but wanted to stay anyways, it wouldn’t have mattered. You happened not to want to do otherwise, but you didn’t know that you couldn’t act on it otherwise. This seems to be the wrong result as well.
What is Frankfurt’s view?
Frankfurt’s view distinguishes between 1st and 2nd order desires. 1st Order Desires are ordinary desires as we usually conceive them, such as the desire to have a sandwich, the desire to do dishes, the desire to clean the house. 2nd Order desires are desires about desires, such as the desire to have a desire for a sandwich (maybe you are sick and need food for energy though nothing is appetizing), the desire to have the desire to wash the dishes and clean the house (maybe your wife isn’t upset at you because you didn’t do your chores but because you don’t even desire to do the chores, so to make her happy, you desire the desire for such chores). Frankfurt is concerned with those desires that we wish to be effective, which he calls “volitions”. So if a person has 2nd order volitions, then that person exercises freedom of the will.
How does Frankfurt’s view deal with the objections to Hume’s view?
In the case of the addict or the kleptomaniac, a person may have a desire to steal but if they have a second order volition to not steal, then they are free. Or if a person is a willing addict and has a second order volition to steal and steal anyway, they are also free. In the case of the locked room, so long as the person locked in the room has second order desire to stay, and that desire is volitional, then that person is also free.
What are some other benefits of the view?
Some benefits of the view is that it accounts for disinclination not ascribe free will to animals, it accounts for why freedom of the will is a good thing, it accounts for our intuitions concerning moral responsibility and it is compatible with determinism.
Frankfurt - Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibilities
What is the principle of Alternate Possibilities?
The principle of Alternate Possibilities states that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise, and this seems obvious in classic cases of coercion.
How does the modified Jone’s example a counterexample to the above principle?
The modified Jones example, which states that if Black forces Jones to do X, so that Jones couldn’t have done otherwise, but Jones decided to do X anyway based on an earlier decision to do X, this would show that he is still morally responsible even though he could not have done otherwise.
What is the impact of this result on the relationship between Freedom of the will and moral responsibility?
What this shows is that we can have determinism and moral responsibility, since those two are often thought to be incompatible. What matters is not “Could Jones have done otherwise” but what does matter is whether his character/reasons that he came up with is the source of his conclusion.
Time Travel
What is Lewis’ way of conceiving time travel?
Lewis’ way of conceiving time travel involve a distinction between personal time and external time. Personal time is like wristwatch time, that is, measurements through the typical stages of a person (infant-teen-adult-elderly). This isn’t time as we usually understand it, but it plays the same role in the time travelers life that time plays for the common person. Time travel means that there isn’t a 1:1 correlation between the two. It would no longer be true that 1 second in personal time would also equal 1 second in external time. It may be greater or lesser, and so the person would have traveled through time.
What are the issues concerning time travel discussed in class and Lewis’ responses to
Personal Identity
The issue concerning personal identity is shown when supposing you went back in time and you talked to yourself. We should ask, which is you? Lewis’ response would be to appeal to 4D, and that what unites us is our mental continuity and bodily continuity with the right causal connections. So it wouldn’t be quite right to say that the whole of him is in two places at once since neither of the two stages are the whole of him.
Causal Loops
The problem with causal loops is seen when we consider that a time travel goes back in time and tells his younger self how to build the time machine. This would only be known because it was told to the older time traveler earlier in his life, which doesn’t explain where the info came from. Lewis responds by saying there is simply no answer, that the parts of the loop are explained but the whole of it is not, and that’s okay since we take other things, like the decay of a tritium atom as being uncaused and inexplicable.
Grandfather Paradoxes (multiple senses of “can”)
The problem here arises when we wonder if the time travel could go back in time and kill his own grandfather before he had any children so that the grandchild would have never been born. But then if he were never to be born, he wouldn’t be able to kill his grandfather, yet there he is. Lewis responds by saying there are different senses of the word “can”. The use of “can” is context sensitive, and possible worlds would help explain this. So for example, I can speak Spanish, that is, it is logically possible that in some world I speak English, there is no contradiction there, but as it so happens, I can’t speak Spanish in the actual world. So one can kill his grandfather because he has what it takes, proficient shooting skills for example, but just doesn’t, and another sense is that he doesn’t because it’s logically impossible to change the past.
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