John Locke on Empiricism
The following is an essay I had to submit for my British Empiricism class.
John Locke is a cornerstone of empiricism. This essay will examine the foundations and justifications of his empiricism and its limits. In contradistinction to his empiricism, we will consider some rationalist critiques from Rene Descartes and some possible responses, and further responses to his project in general.
A classical way of summarizing the empiricism of Locke is as follows: all simple ideas originate in experience. This will be analyzed into its parts. Experience here specifically means sensation and reflection (II.1.2). Sensation is the observation of external sensible objects, and reflection is the observation of the internal operations of our minds (II.1.2). Observation of external sensible objects would be things like soft, bitter, and hot (II.1.3). Operations of the mind are things like doubting, thinking, willing, and reasoning (II.1.4) Ideas are the objects of the understanding (I.1.8) and come in either simples or complexes (II.2.1). Simple ideas cannot be distinguishable or broken down further into different ideas and are not compounded (II.2.1) Much like corpuscles, they are irreducible. Examples would be things like coldness and hardness, sweetness and whiteness (II.2.1). Complex or compounded ideas would be things like a unicorn, which combines the idea of horse and horn.
Locke restricts the claim that ideas originate in sensation and reflection to simple ideas because the understanding is passive (II.1.25). The understanding begins as “a white paper, void of all character” (II.1.2) So what it does then is “store” ideas (II.1.2) but complex ideas are active operations of the understanding and can use simple ideas (which are impressed upon the understanding) in “an almost infinite variety”. One can therefore invent all kinds of complex ideas, but one cannot invent new simple ideas (II.1.2) So simple ideas are passively “imprinted” (II.15) upon the understanding, while complex ones are actively invented, and the understanding works as the former and not the latter. Simply put, if ideas simpliciter were a result of experience, then we would be able to invent counter-examples. Unicorns, for example, do not come to our understanding by experience since surely no one has ever experienced a unicorn. So, in order to avoid this easy counter-example, Locke qualifies that only simple ideas come to us or originate by way of experience.
Locke attempts to justify this empiricism in a cumulative way, that is to say, not by giving a collection of proofs or knock down arguments, but giving pieces of evidence when gathered and put together make a more plausible than not case for this thesis. The three kinds of evidence he puts forth are appeals to introspection, to the experience of children, and the (non) experience of people with sensory incapacities. In his appeal to introspection, he challenges the reader to give any counter-example to his thesis (II.1.5). If there is no idea one can muster up that did not originate in experience, then the absence suggests to Locke that it cannot be done, and so his empiricism is reasonable. In the appeal to children, particularly newborns, Locke says to simply look at them and try to figure out if they have any of the innate ideas they are purported to have (II.1.6). It doesn’t seem like they do, so they probably don’t. Continuing on the idea of children who lack experience, he proposed a thought experiment. If there were a child who was kept in place with no color but black and white, then intuitively we think that he would have no idea of green, or knowledge of certain tastes if he never tasted those things (II.1.6). What our intuition is supposed to show us is that we do think that ideas do come from experience.
My own evaluation of this evidence is that it is weak at worst, incomplete half truths at best. It seems as though this cannot account for moral truths, like do good and avoid evil and logical truths like the law of non contradiction. It does seem like even infants work upon this moral principle as their good constitutes sustenance, and they naturally suck at their mothers breast. Sure, it may not be as refined or well developed understanding as someone who is older, but it still remains, innately, and is being exercised. Something doesn’t seem to have to be clear and perfectly understood to be innate. Another possible counterexample is that God can impart knowledge to a person directly, such as faith (Fides et Ratio 1998). I don’t think this would count as an internal operation of the mind as I did not exercise any operation for its acquisition. Sure, this is an extraordinary and supernatural mode of knowledge, but Locke is a Christian and so am I, so I don’t think it’s too out of bounds to discuss as a piece of data we need to consider.
Locke would respond to the objection that he has not decisively proven that all simple ideas originate in experience by shrugging his shoulders and saying something like “So what?” He doesn’t aim to do that. Perhaps Descartes was aiming for something like a mathematical proof for his project, but Locke isn’t interested in meeting that same high standard. So long as his method is reliable and good enough, it is sufficient for knowledge. Locke is more concerned about the limits of human knowledge rather than its grounding. One needn’t be so doctrinaire as Descartes about the sciences in order to actually do science, which is part of what is motivating Locke. Nor does one have to invent spooky and occult like innate ideas. Locke’s account arguably has more plausibility since what is imparting ideas to us is tangible.
Descartes would likely respond by questioning whether Locke does give us reliable enough knowledge if we are pointing a faulty device, the understanding, to itself. Descartes may wonder how Locke fends off skepticism, which was a concern for Descartes. Since for Descartes, in order to know the external world, you had to posit innate ideas, which leads one to God, which gives us reason to trust our sensory faculties, Descartes would say Locke’s project can’t even get off the ground concerning the external world which he relies on. That man is essentially a thinking thing with these innate ideas is supposed to be the antidote to these problems.
However, this Cartesian anthropology represents a direct threat to Locke’s view. For Descartes, the soul always thinks because that’s the same as saying “this person exists”. If there is no thinking, at least of innate ideas, there is no person. But even fetuses are persons that exist, so it must think, but their kind of thinking must be then that which involves innate ideas, or simple ideas that derived from without experience. Locke disputes this in several ways. First, Locke points to times of dullness where he isn’t really thinking about anything is particular (II.1.10). Second, the argument that the soul must always think because thinking is essential to it is to beg the question (II.1.10). Third, contrary to the claim that it is self evident that the soul is always thinking, Locke thinks an appeal to the general public will disprove that (II.1.10). Fourth, sleep is a counter example of where we persist, but we don’t think (II.1.10-11). Following up on the idea of sleep, Locke argues that if one thinks while one is asleep, as was supposed by some, then it would be possible for the soul of a sleeping man to enter the body of an unsouled person, and thereby make two persons, which is an absurd consequence (II.1.12). Further, if men think while they are asleep, they should be able to recall their sleep, which they don’t (II.1.14). So we would have to make a distinction between a sleeping subject and completely different awake subject, which is absurd.
Despite some of the absurd consequences of the views Locke was opposing, Locke may have some problems of his own. For example, it may be objected that Locke’s claim has the absurd consequence that complex ideas of objects such as a tree, other people, etc. are mental fictions that we invent. Locke would respond that we experience objects with uniformity, that is to say, when we take some object, we often times observe more than just one quality simultaneously. The ideas themselves are distinct and separate, but as they present themselves to the sense, they are united and blended, and it is upon this grounding that we can coherently call an object a compound out there in the external world (II.2.1). The imagination, however, is not so constant and uniform. So it is by this criteria we can tell the difference and the distinction isn’t all that difficult to make.
John Locke is a cornerstone of empiricism. This essay will examine the foundations and justifications of his empiricism and its limits. In contradistinction to his empiricism, we will consider some rationalist critiques from Rene Descartes and some possible responses, and further responses to his project in general.
A classical way of summarizing the empiricism of Locke is as follows: all simple ideas originate in experience. This will be analyzed into its parts. Experience here specifically means sensation and reflection (II.1.2). Sensation is the observation of external sensible objects, and reflection is the observation of the internal operations of our minds (II.1.2). Observation of external sensible objects would be things like soft, bitter, and hot (II.1.3). Operations of the mind are things like doubting, thinking, willing, and reasoning (II.1.4) Ideas are the objects of the understanding (I.1.8) and come in either simples or complexes (II.2.1). Simple ideas cannot be distinguishable or broken down further into different ideas and are not compounded (II.2.1) Much like corpuscles, they are irreducible. Examples would be things like coldness and hardness, sweetness and whiteness (II.2.1). Complex or compounded ideas would be things like a unicorn, which combines the idea of horse and horn.
Locke restricts the claim that ideas originate in sensation and reflection to simple ideas because the understanding is passive (II.1.25). The understanding begins as “a white paper, void of all character” (II.1.2) So what it does then is “store” ideas (II.1.2) but complex ideas are active operations of the understanding and can use simple ideas (which are impressed upon the understanding) in “an almost infinite variety”. One can therefore invent all kinds of complex ideas, but one cannot invent new simple ideas (II.1.2) So simple ideas are passively “imprinted” (II.15) upon the understanding, while complex ones are actively invented, and the understanding works as the former and not the latter. Simply put, if ideas simpliciter were a result of experience, then we would be able to invent counter-examples. Unicorns, for example, do not come to our understanding by experience since surely no one has ever experienced a unicorn. So, in order to avoid this easy counter-example, Locke qualifies that only simple ideas come to us or originate by way of experience.
Locke attempts to justify this empiricism in a cumulative way, that is to say, not by giving a collection of proofs or knock down arguments, but giving pieces of evidence when gathered and put together make a more plausible than not case for this thesis. The three kinds of evidence he puts forth are appeals to introspection, to the experience of children, and the (non) experience of people with sensory incapacities. In his appeal to introspection, he challenges the reader to give any counter-example to his thesis (II.1.5). If there is no idea one can muster up that did not originate in experience, then the absence suggests to Locke that it cannot be done, and so his empiricism is reasonable. In the appeal to children, particularly newborns, Locke says to simply look at them and try to figure out if they have any of the innate ideas they are purported to have (II.1.6). It doesn’t seem like they do, so they probably don’t. Continuing on the idea of children who lack experience, he proposed a thought experiment. If there were a child who was kept in place with no color but black and white, then intuitively we think that he would have no idea of green, or knowledge of certain tastes if he never tasted those things (II.1.6). What our intuition is supposed to show us is that we do think that ideas do come from experience.
My own evaluation of this evidence is that it is weak at worst, incomplete half truths at best. It seems as though this cannot account for moral truths, like do good and avoid evil and logical truths like the law of non contradiction. It does seem like even infants work upon this moral principle as their good constitutes sustenance, and they naturally suck at their mothers breast. Sure, it may not be as refined or well developed understanding as someone who is older, but it still remains, innately, and is being exercised. Something doesn’t seem to have to be clear and perfectly understood to be innate. Another possible counterexample is that God can impart knowledge to a person directly, such as faith (Fides et Ratio 1998). I don’t think this would count as an internal operation of the mind as I did not exercise any operation for its acquisition. Sure, this is an extraordinary and supernatural mode of knowledge, but Locke is a Christian and so am I, so I don’t think it’s too out of bounds to discuss as a piece of data we need to consider.
Locke would respond to the objection that he has not decisively proven that all simple ideas originate in experience by shrugging his shoulders and saying something like “So what?” He doesn’t aim to do that. Perhaps Descartes was aiming for something like a mathematical proof for his project, but Locke isn’t interested in meeting that same high standard. So long as his method is reliable and good enough, it is sufficient for knowledge. Locke is more concerned about the limits of human knowledge rather than its grounding. One needn’t be so doctrinaire as Descartes about the sciences in order to actually do science, which is part of what is motivating Locke. Nor does one have to invent spooky and occult like innate ideas. Locke’s account arguably has more plausibility since what is imparting ideas to us is tangible.
Descartes would likely respond by questioning whether Locke does give us reliable enough knowledge if we are pointing a faulty device, the understanding, to itself. Descartes may wonder how Locke fends off skepticism, which was a concern for Descartes. Since for Descartes, in order to know the external world, you had to posit innate ideas, which leads one to God, which gives us reason to trust our sensory faculties, Descartes would say Locke’s project can’t even get off the ground concerning the external world which he relies on. That man is essentially a thinking thing with these innate ideas is supposed to be the antidote to these problems.
However, this Cartesian anthropology represents a direct threat to Locke’s view. For Descartes, the soul always thinks because that’s the same as saying “this person exists”. If there is no thinking, at least of innate ideas, there is no person. But even fetuses are persons that exist, so it must think, but their kind of thinking must be then that which involves innate ideas, or simple ideas that derived from without experience. Locke disputes this in several ways. First, Locke points to times of dullness where he isn’t really thinking about anything is particular (II.1.10). Second, the argument that the soul must always think because thinking is essential to it is to beg the question (II.1.10). Third, contrary to the claim that it is self evident that the soul is always thinking, Locke thinks an appeal to the general public will disprove that (II.1.10). Fourth, sleep is a counter example of where we persist, but we don’t think (II.1.10-11). Following up on the idea of sleep, Locke argues that if one thinks while one is asleep, as was supposed by some, then it would be possible for the soul of a sleeping man to enter the body of an unsouled person, and thereby make two persons, which is an absurd consequence (II.1.12). Further, if men think while they are asleep, they should be able to recall their sleep, which they don’t (II.1.14). So we would have to make a distinction between a sleeping subject and completely different awake subject, which is absurd.
Despite some of the absurd consequences of the views Locke was opposing, Locke may have some problems of his own. For example, it may be objected that Locke’s claim has the absurd consequence that complex ideas of objects such as a tree, other people, etc. are mental fictions that we invent. Locke would respond that we experience objects with uniformity, that is to say, when we take some object, we often times observe more than just one quality simultaneously. The ideas themselves are distinct and separate, but as they present themselves to the sense, they are united and blended, and it is upon this grounding that we can coherently call an object a compound out there in the external world (II.2.1). The imagination, however, is not so constant and uniform. So it is by this criteria we can tell the difference and the distinction isn’t all that difficult to make.
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