Analytic Philosophy Midterm
The following is an essay I had to turn in for my analytic philosophy class.
Analytic philosophy begins with Immanuel Kant and his distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. Analytic propositions are those which express nothing in the predicate which is not already in the concept, whereas synthetic propositions are those which do predicate something to the subject, and thus amplifies our knowledge (“Prolegomena” p.10).1Because the predicate is already thought up in the concept, all analytic propositions have the property of being a priori in nature, whereas synthetic propositions can be either a priori or a posteriori (Ibid. p.10).2There is some contention about whether there really is synthetic a priori knowledge, however, since synthetic judgments are often thought to come from experience, which doesn’t seem to be part of what it means to be a priori.3Kant argues that mathematical judgements are synthetic a priori, since they do not directly rely on the principle of noncontradiction, a necessary feature of analytic judgements (Ibid. p.11).
Reacting to Kant is F.H. Bradley who rejects Kant’s framework of the relation between subject and predicate. In appealing to a thing's relation to its properties is to fall into an infinite regress.4If you have some object S and P, and there is some relation R which appear with both of them but is not identical to them, then we need to explain exactly how R is in relation in S and P, which would lead to some other relation R2, which would itself need to be explained, ad infinitum (“Appearance and Reality” p.6). If Kant’s view is wrong, what view is right? Bradley proposes that since there can be no relations between objects, then what exists must then be one object, or Monism (Ibid. p.11-12). Since there is no division in reality, and division implies relations which don’t exist, then what exists must be simple (Ibid. p.12). Since consciousness or perception is undeniably real (Ibid. p.10) then that must be what is fundamentally real, which is Idealism.5
Whatever arguments one can muster for Idealism, it will oftentimes result in being unintuitive and contrary to common sense. Is my cat really essentially the same as me and my consciousness? This seems ridiculous. This intuition is exemplified in G.E. Moore’s argument proof of the external world. Moore argues that if he can hold up his hands, then that is sufficient proof that there are, in space and time, at least two things external and distinct from our minds (“Proof of an External World” p.166). Now which is more plausible, that I know I have hands, or that the Idealism argument is correct? It seems like unless you are hindered by having a PhD, you would have to say it is more likely that you actually have hands. Thus Moore’s argument from hands vindicates common sense.6Further, contrary to Idealism, Moore points out that if the content of the idea is what the idea is, as Idealists maintain, then we find ourselves in an infinite regress since the act of thinking that thing and the object of that thing are distinct, then I must have knowledge of that act before I can think it, and then knowledge of that act, ad infinitum, which is problematic (“Nature of Judgement” p.3).7
The direct realism of Moore may be too naive, however. If there indeed is a relation between our mind and objects, and these relations inform the truth value of propositions, then how can we determine the truth value of propositions in which the subject of a proposition is nonexistent? This is the problem of negative existentials.8 Bertrand Russell attempts to solve this problem by noting that while it may be problematic for the way we use everyday language, it needn’t be a problem in the way we construct the proposition in logic, which is to say, there’s a distinction between the logical form of a proposition and a grammatical form. So while the grammatical form may have meaning, it needn’t necessarily denote anything, and those denoting phrases are reduced to definite descriptions (“On Denoting” p.483).9 But this has implications for existants as well. The sentence, “The man with the knife is trying to kill me” can inform us in one of two ways. If, like negative existentials, we do not directly apprehend a man with a knife, then this is said to be knowledge by description. If we immediately see the person with the knife, then we are directly acquainted with that person and this is how we have knowledge of the world (“Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description p.108).10 Since all knowledge of description has some knowledge of acquaintance built into it, knowledge by acquaintance provides a foundation for the rest of our knowledge.11
Does this fall victim to naive realism? Not so, since for Russell, what we have direct acquaintance with is sense-data, which isn’t identical to the material object we associate with since sense data has properties, like perceiving color, whereas matter, like molecules, don’t have color (“The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics” p.2).12 A problem arises, however, that different people may have different sense-data of a physical object, and so it would be difficult to bridge the gap between our knowledge and the object itself. Russell solves this by appealing to Occam’s razor and saying that we needn’t posit several entities to explain some sense-data (Ibid. p.9), but can posit as a logical construction a singular entity which we call material. Whether this can account for heaps in such sentences like, “The swarm attacked me” remains to be seen.13
While Russell avoids naive realism, he also avoids Idealism. With his pieces of denotation, acquaintance and sense-data, we can translate all sentences to their logical form, and every sentence will have simples, or atoms, which contain subjects and predicates, or universals (“Russell’s Logical Atomism” p.5). Since sentences are made true or not by their correspondence to the world, the world must be real and instantiate universals, contrary to Idealism.14With this language, we have an understanding of how the world works and by reducing philosophical problems to their logical form, we can clearly see the solutions to them or see that they were not problems at all, but merely confusions due to our grammatical language (Ibid. p.3).15
Analytic philosophy begins with Immanuel Kant and his distinction between analytic and synthetic propositions. Analytic propositions are those which express nothing in the predicate which is not already in the concept, whereas synthetic propositions are those which do predicate something to the subject, and thus amplifies our knowledge (“Prolegomena” p.10).1Because the predicate is already thought up in the concept, all analytic propositions have the property of being a priori in nature, whereas synthetic propositions can be either a priori or a posteriori (Ibid. p.10).2There is some contention about whether there really is synthetic a priori knowledge, however, since synthetic judgments are often thought to come from experience, which doesn’t seem to be part of what it means to be a priori.3Kant argues that mathematical judgements are synthetic a priori, since they do not directly rely on the principle of noncontradiction, a necessary feature of analytic judgements (Ibid. p.11).
Reacting to Kant is F.H. Bradley who rejects Kant’s framework of the relation between subject and predicate. In appealing to a thing's relation to its properties is to fall into an infinite regress.4If you have some object S and P, and there is some relation R which appear with both of them but is not identical to them, then we need to explain exactly how R is in relation in S and P, which would lead to some other relation R2, which would itself need to be explained, ad infinitum (“Appearance and Reality” p.6). If Kant’s view is wrong, what view is right? Bradley proposes that since there can be no relations between objects, then what exists must then be one object, or Monism (Ibid. p.11-12). Since there is no division in reality, and division implies relations which don’t exist, then what exists must be simple (Ibid. p.12). Since consciousness or perception is undeniably real (Ibid. p.10) then that must be what is fundamentally real, which is Idealism.5
Whatever arguments one can muster for Idealism, it will oftentimes result in being unintuitive and contrary to common sense. Is my cat really essentially the same as me and my consciousness? This seems ridiculous. This intuition is exemplified in G.E. Moore’s argument proof of the external world. Moore argues that if he can hold up his hands, then that is sufficient proof that there are, in space and time, at least two things external and distinct from our minds (“Proof of an External World” p.166). Now which is more plausible, that I know I have hands, or that the Idealism argument is correct? It seems like unless you are hindered by having a PhD, you would have to say it is more likely that you actually have hands. Thus Moore’s argument from hands vindicates common sense.6Further, contrary to Idealism, Moore points out that if the content of the idea is what the idea is, as Idealists maintain, then we find ourselves in an infinite regress since the act of thinking that thing and the object of that thing are distinct, then I must have knowledge of that act before I can think it, and then knowledge of that act, ad infinitum, which is problematic (“Nature of Judgement” p.3).7
The direct realism of Moore may be too naive, however. If there indeed is a relation between our mind and objects, and these relations inform the truth value of propositions, then how can we determine the truth value of propositions in which the subject of a proposition is nonexistent? This is the problem of negative existentials.8 Bertrand Russell attempts to solve this problem by noting that while it may be problematic for the way we use everyday language, it needn’t be a problem in the way we construct the proposition in logic, which is to say, there’s a distinction between the logical form of a proposition and a grammatical form. So while the grammatical form may have meaning, it needn’t necessarily denote anything, and those denoting phrases are reduced to definite descriptions (“On Denoting” p.483).9 But this has implications for existants as well. The sentence, “The man with the knife is trying to kill me” can inform us in one of two ways. If, like negative existentials, we do not directly apprehend a man with a knife, then this is said to be knowledge by description. If we immediately see the person with the knife, then we are directly acquainted with that person and this is how we have knowledge of the world (“Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description p.108).10 Since all knowledge of description has some knowledge of acquaintance built into it, knowledge by acquaintance provides a foundation for the rest of our knowledge.11
Does this fall victim to naive realism? Not so, since for Russell, what we have direct acquaintance with is sense-data, which isn’t identical to the material object we associate with since sense data has properties, like perceiving color, whereas matter, like molecules, don’t have color (“The Relation of Sense-Data to Physics” p.2).12 A problem arises, however, that different people may have different sense-data of a physical object, and so it would be difficult to bridge the gap between our knowledge and the object itself. Russell solves this by appealing to Occam’s razor and saying that we needn’t posit several entities to explain some sense-data (Ibid. p.9), but can posit as a logical construction a singular entity which we call material. Whether this can account for heaps in such sentences like, “The swarm attacked me” remains to be seen.13
While Russell avoids naive realism, he also avoids Idealism. With his pieces of denotation, acquaintance and sense-data, we can translate all sentences to their logical form, and every sentence will have simples, or atoms, which contain subjects and predicates, or universals (“Russell’s Logical Atomism” p.5). Since sentences are made true or not by their correspondence to the world, the world must be real and instantiate universals, contrary to Idealism.14With this language, we have an understanding of how the world works and by reducing philosophical problems to their logical form, we can clearly see the solutions to them or see that they were not problems at all, but merely confusions due to our grammatical language (Ibid. p.3).15
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