Euthyphro
The following is a paper I wrote for class. To avoid plagiarism, I won't be putting up the prompt, just my findings.
In trying to defend his scandalous actions to Socrates, Euthyphro argues that his actions are pious, which implies some knowledge of what the nature of piety is. At first, Euthyphro gives a rough definition as being that which the gods love, but soon refines it to be that which all the gods love. Socrates then asks, “Is the pious being loved by all the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?”
Socrates goes on to flesh out what the thrust of his argument is, giving analogous examples such as being carried and being seen. What those examples are supposed to show is that when we try to define the nature of a thing, we have to be able to explain it in such a way that it wouldn’t be dependent on anything else. Some of the examples he gives are being led and being carried. The point of these examples is that one gives rise to the other, but not the other way around. Carrying a thing gives rise to a thing being carried, but it isn’t true that a thing being carried gives rise to carrying a thing. Likewise, being led gives rise to something led, but something led doesn’t give rise to being led.
Socrates drives this home when he asks Euthyphro if an act is loved by all the gods because it is pious, to which Euthyphro agrees. That eliminates the other option of Socrates original question, which was an act is pious because it is being loved by all the gods. Now we just focus on whether or not an act is loved by all the gods because the act is pious is a good answer or not. Socrates says this is not a good answer. If an act is pious because all the gods love it, but all the gods love it because it is pious, then all you’ve shown is that while the two may always coincide, the relationship isn’t a necessary one, and definitely not an explanatory one.
To summarize the problem, let us put it this way. Why is an act pious? Because all the gods love it. Why do the gods love it? Because it is pious. Why is it pious? And now we’ve ended right where we started. This sounds circular and circularity provides no grounding or explanation.
To better understand the distinction, there may be some analogous examples. For some thing that has a nature, it may have some properties, that is, things that are not essential or necessary to the nature or definition of the thing. An example may be, for every leaf there is an associated weight. A leaf that didn’t have a certain weight wouldn’t be a leaf. However, weight is not identical or is not the same thing as being a leaf, even if the two do coincide all the time. So in the same way, Socrates is saying that while Euthyphro may have given a feature that always coincides with piety, that which is loved by all the gods, it isn’t necessarily identical to piety itself. It may be a necessary accident, but not part of its essence.
Could Euthyphro be let off the hook and say that while Socrates wanted to know what the pious and impious was, Euthyphro satisfactorily answered him? Probably not. At first Euthyphro gives an instance of what piety is, which does partially answer Socrates, for instances must contain the form in some sense. So, while Euthyphro may recognize instances of the form of piety, it doesn’t exactly isolate and reduce to the form itself, which is what Socrates later clarifies is he wants. The problem with Euthyphro’s initial answer is that it may contain some properties or accidents that have the potential to confuse one as to what is is indeed essential to a thing and what is not. Socrates says he wants to use whatever answer Euthyphro gives him as a model, and accidents or properties not essential to the model may by accident eliminate other instances of the form, and thus we would not have true knowledge of whatever form we are seeking.
Perhaps Euthyphro could also say that definitions by pointing to instances may not satisfy precisely what Socrates is asking for, but they do however satisfy Socrates’ purposes. Perhaps the standard Socrates sets out is too high anyways for genuine knowledge. So in that way, Euthyphro is fine with the definition he has given.
Euthyphro
In trying to defend his scandalous actions to Socrates, Euthyphro argues that his actions are pious, which implies some knowledge of what the nature of piety is. At first, Euthyphro gives a rough definition as being that which the gods love, but soon refines it to be that which all the gods love. Socrates then asks, “Is the pious being loved by all the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?”
Socrates goes on to flesh out what the thrust of his argument is, giving analogous examples such as being carried and being seen. What those examples are supposed to show is that when we try to define the nature of a thing, we have to be able to explain it in such a way that it wouldn’t be dependent on anything else. Some of the examples he gives are being led and being carried. The point of these examples is that one gives rise to the other, but not the other way around. Carrying a thing gives rise to a thing being carried, but it isn’t true that a thing being carried gives rise to carrying a thing. Likewise, being led gives rise to something led, but something led doesn’t give rise to being led.
Socrates drives this home when he asks Euthyphro if an act is loved by all the gods because it is pious, to which Euthyphro agrees. That eliminates the other option of Socrates original question, which was an act is pious because it is being loved by all the gods. Now we just focus on whether or not an act is loved by all the gods because the act is pious is a good answer or not. Socrates says this is not a good answer. If an act is pious because all the gods love it, but all the gods love it because it is pious, then all you’ve shown is that while the two may always coincide, the relationship isn’t a necessary one, and definitely not an explanatory one.
To summarize the problem, let us put it this way. Why is an act pious? Because all the gods love it. Why do the gods love it? Because it is pious. Why is it pious? And now we’ve ended right where we started. This sounds circular and circularity provides no grounding or explanation.
To better understand the distinction, there may be some analogous examples. For some thing that has a nature, it may have some properties, that is, things that are not essential or necessary to the nature or definition of the thing. An example may be, for every leaf there is an associated weight. A leaf that didn’t have a certain weight wouldn’t be a leaf. However, weight is not identical or is not the same thing as being a leaf, even if the two do coincide all the time. So in the same way, Socrates is saying that while Euthyphro may have given a feature that always coincides with piety, that which is loved by all the gods, it isn’t necessarily identical to piety itself. It may be a necessary accident, but not part of its essence.
Could Euthyphro be let off the hook and say that while Socrates wanted to know what the pious and impious was, Euthyphro satisfactorily answered him? Probably not. At first Euthyphro gives an instance of what piety is, which does partially answer Socrates, for instances must contain the form in some sense. So, while Euthyphro may recognize instances of the form of piety, it doesn’t exactly isolate and reduce to the form itself, which is what Socrates later clarifies is he wants. The problem with Euthyphro’s initial answer is that it may contain some properties or accidents that have the potential to confuse one as to what is is indeed essential to a thing and what is not. Socrates says he wants to use whatever answer Euthyphro gives him as a model, and accidents or properties not essential to the model may by accident eliminate other instances of the form, and thus we would not have true knowledge of whatever form we are seeking.
Perhaps Euthyphro could also say that definitions by pointing to instances may not satisfy precisely what Socrates is asking for, but they do however satisfy Socrates’ purposes. Perhaps the standard Socrates sets out is too high anyways for genuine knowledge. So in that way, Euthyphro is fine with the definition he has given.
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