Philosophy of Religion Study Guide
The following is a study guide I typed out for my philosophy of religion class.
The Problem of Evil
A. “Evil and Omnipotence” J.L. Mackie
(1) Explain the problem of evil.
The problem of evil states there is a contradiction within this set of statements: God is omnipotent, God is wholly good, and evil exists. Since God is omnibenevolent, God wishes to abolish evil, and since God is omnipotent, then God could abolish evil. If an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God exists, then evil does not exist. But since evil exists, then an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God does not exist.
(2) Explain the problems with the four fallacious solutions Mackie considers.
1. “Good cannot exist without evil” or “Evil is a necessary counterpart to good”
The main problem with this response is that it restricts God’s omnipotence, if not outright rejects it. If God and evil are necessary counterparts, then God cannot eliminate evil. This would also make “good” and “evil” similar to being “great” and “small”, but God is not typically understood in this relative sense. Couldn’t we think of God in an absolute and isolated sense? Further, why think that evil must be realized for there to be good?
2. “Evil is necessary as a means to good”
Again, this restricts God’s omnipotence. If evil is necessary as a means for good, this would make God subject to causal laws, which is tension with omnipotence and conflicts with the common notion that God creates causal laws.
3. “The universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if there were no evil.”
This reply can be understood aesthetically or progressively. The aesthetic understanding states that evil gives contrast or highlights goodness and beauty in the world. But it isn’t clear evil would be necessary to fully appreciate goodness and beauty in the world. The progressive version states that gradually overcoming evil makes for a better world. For example, there may be 1st order evils like pain and danger in order that there be 2nd order goods, like sympathy and heroism. The problem with this response is that it would qualify God’s omnibenevolence by making God more concerned about maximizing goods rather than minimizing evils. This would only make benevolence a derivative value. Further, this only pushes the question back a step. What then of 2nd order evils, like cruelty and malevolence? Supposing you could give an answer by appealing to 3rd order goods, then the problem simply arises again with 3rd order evils, ad infinitum. So a regress problem occurs.
4. “Evil is due to human free will”
This response shifts evil from being ascribed to God to being ascribed to man. Evil would be due to man's free choices, and freedom would be a 3rd order good. But if this is so, why couldn’t it be that God make every man freely choose good and not evil? Perhaps it may be said that it is impossible to make someone do something freely. Aside from limiting God’s omnipotence, this then this raises the question as to whether the will is a product of our characters or a product of chance. If it is due to our character, then why hasn’t God given us a better character? And if it is random, then it isn’t clear why freedom of the will is a good.
B. “The Inductive Argument from Evil against the Existence of God” William Rowe
(1) Explain Rowe’s version of the problem of evil.
Rowe’s version of the problem of evil is one that states that given the amount of gratuitous human and animal suffering, it is unlikely that God exists. There are instances of intense human and animal suffering that God could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil that is (at least) as bad. If God exists, God would prevent the intense human and animal suffering unless God could not do so without losing some greater good or preventing some evil that is at least as bad, so God does not exist. The amount of instances of 1 make the argument more plausible.
(2) Explain the ‘Fawn Scenario’ and its relevant features concerning the problem of evil.
The Fawn Scenario asks us to consider a fawn trapped in a fire who suffers greatly before dying. The suffering is not a product of human agency and easily preventable, but seemingly pointless, that is to say, not required to bring about a greater good. This is supposed to make it rational to believe the first premise of the argument, even if it doesn’t conclusively prove it.
(3) Explain the ‘G.E. Moore Shift’ as a response to the argument.
The G.E. Moore shift is taking a modus tollens of the argument. So if you had 1) A 2) If A then B 3) Therefore, B you could attack the argument either directly by attacking A or indirectly by demonstrating ~B. This latter indirect way is just a modus tollens. As it relates to the problem of evil, if the argument is set up (this is a simplistic version, and not exactly the version Rowe lays out) 1) Unnecessary evil exists 2) If unnecessary evil exists then God does not exist 3) Therefore God does not exist, then the G.E. Moore shift here would not be to attack the proposition that unnecessary evil exists but to show that God exists and is more likely or has an edge over the proposition that unnecessary evil exists.
(4) Explain the difference between unfriendly, indifferent, and friendly atheism.
Unfriendly atheism is the view that no one is rationally justified in believing God exists. Indifferent atheism is when one has no belief about the rationality of believing in God. Friendly atheism is the view that someone can believe there is a God and someone else believe there is not a God and have both people be rational.
C. “The Free Will Defense” Alvin Plantinga
(1) Explain the ‘free will defense’ in response to The Problem of Evil.
The free will defense in response to the problem of evil states that there is no contradiction between God’s omnipotence, benevolence, and the existence of evil so long as we add to that set of propositions “ It is possible that God could not have created a world containing moral good without creating one that also contained moral evil” and if that is possible, then God has a good reason for creating a world containing evil, and then the contradiction in the set of statements goes away, and so would the problem of evil.
(2) Explain how God’s omnipotence appears to create problems for the ‘free will defense’.
God’s omnipotence appears to create a problem for the free will defense when we consider that there is no contradiction or inconsistency in there being a world in which God creates where men are free but always freely choose good. In some possible world people act freely and always choose what is good, and if God can create any world, why not this one? This would be mean that the free will defense puts a limitation on God’s omnipotence.
(3) Explain Plantinga’s argument that there are some possible worlds that God could not create.
Plantinga argues that not every possible state of affairs is a possible world. It is an element of a possible world, but is not inclusive enough. A state of affairs A precludes a state of affairs B if it is not possible that both obtain (MJ being the GOAT precludes LeBron being the GOAT). A is a complete state of affairs if and only if for every state of affairs B, either A includes or precludes B. So a possible world is any possible state of affairs that is complete. Now God actualizes only one world. So in some possible world, (S^A) is true, and in another world (S^~A) is true, so when God actualizes a world, either A v ~A is true, but not A^~A. Suppose Maurice is considering what to eat for breakfast, and let S be the state of affairs that in the actual world include being free to eat oatmeal at T (A) and also being free to refrain from eating oatmeal at T (~A). Now God being omniscient knows either than when S’ obtains, Maurice will either freely choose A or ~A. But then this means that the kind of world that God can create is partly dependent on creatures free choice. If Maurice chooses A, then there is a world W1 God, though omnipotent, cannot create, W2. W1 and W2 are both possible worlds, but A is actually true, which means only W1 will be created. If God causes Maurice to choose ~A, then W2 does not obtain because S is denied where S contains freedom. From this, it is possible that God is omnipotent and it was not within His power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil, and thus it is false that an omnipotent God could actualize any possible world.
D. “Must God Create the Best” Robert Adams (Posted Online)
(1) Explain the thesis that Adam’s defends in this paper, and why it requires rejecting Act Utilitarianism.
Adam’s thesis is that God could have created a world in which none of the creatures in it would exist in the BPW, those creatures have a life worth living (in a minimal sense) and they are at least as happy as they would have been in any possible world in which they could have existed. This is essentially a rejection of the proposition that God must create the BPW, and this proposition must be true if act utilitarianism is also true. So if Adam’s want to deny that God must create the BPW, then he must also reject act utilitarianism.
(2) Explain the problem with the contention that God wrongs creatures he chooses not to create.
The problem with this contention is that it doesn’t seem like God has an obligation to those who only possibly exist but don’t actually exist. This distinction is morally important since who a being who never exists is not wronged, and there can be no obligations to them. This is distinct from the probability of someone actually existing, which is greater than 0. Being merely logically possible doesn’t have the same moral weight and there is no obligation to bring them into existence either.
(3) Explain how God’s grace figures in an explanation of His creating a less-than-perfect world.
The concern with God not creating the best possible world is that it may seem to suggest that there is a kindness lacking within God. But this suffers from the defect of envy. Simply creating for love is sufficient grounds for creation. Grace is the disposition to love which is not dependent on the merit of the person loved, and not dependent on whether they exist in the best possible world. God’s graciousness in creation doesn’t imply the creatures he creates are the grounds for choosing to create them. We don’t praise God for His good judgment in creating us, but we consider His creating us as a personal favor. This grace is part of God’s perfect goodness. If that is the case, there is nothing that obligates God to create the BPW.
(4) Explain the Counterexample, i.e., ‘Case A’, that Adam’s considers to his argument. (And, be able to supply his rejoinder to this counterexample.)
The counterexample asks us to consider a person who conceives a child then damages it by giving him a shot. They may love the child dearly, and the child on the whole may be happy, but the parents have clearly wronged the child. And so it goes with God who doesn’t create the best possible world. Adam’s rejoinders that it is wrong for human beings to cause, knowingly and voluntarily, the procreation of an offspring of human parents which is notably deficient by comparison with a normal human being in mental or physical capacity. This would not be arbitrary under Christianity. God created us with an intent, and we must act in accord to that end. To go against that would go against God.
Part II – Arguments for God’s Existence
A. “St. Anselm’s Ontological Argument” Norman Malcolm
(1) Explain Anslem’s Ontological Argument for God’s existence.
God is that which a greater cannot be conceived. Whatever it is that God is, it isn’t possible to concieve of something greater. Now, something a greater than which cannot be conceived exists in the understanding. Many, if not most, atheists would agree with this definition, even if they reject that it actually exists. They have know what it is they are rejecting. To exist in reality is greater than to exist in the understanding alone. For example, the idea of having a million dollars isn’t as great as also actually having those million dollars. So having being is greater than just being an idea. If God exists in the understanding alone, then God would not be that than which a greater cannot be conceived, since I could conceive of a God that also exists and that would be greater. Thus God exists in reality as well as the understanding. And this is just to say God actually exists.
(2) Explain the Existence-is-not-a-property Objection and the Lost Island Objection.
The existence-is-not-a-property objection states that predicating existence to a thing doesn’t add anything to out knowledge of the thing. So if I were to compare two butlers, and each had a set of properties, such as being disciplined and on time, these tell me things about the butler. But if I were to say that this butler exists and that one does not, I don’t seem to add anything to my knowledge about those butlers. So existence isn’t a property. The Lost Island objection attempts to parody the ontological argument by substituting “God” with “Lost Island” and then have the Lost Island be defined as the island which a greater cannot be conceived. And if that argument runs through, then you could replace “God” with anything else and thus prove that it exists, which is absurd.
(3) Explain Anselm’s Ontological Argument for God’s necessary existence.
Anselm’s 2nd argument argues that God is either necessary or impossible. God either does or does not exist. God cannot come into existence, because if He did, then He would be a limited or finite being, which is not what we think of God as. If God does not exist and God cannot come into existence, then God’s existence is impossible, which seems true by definition. If God does exist, then he cannot come into existence, or cease to exist, for this too would make God a finite or limited being, which God is not. But if God exists and cannot come into existence or cease to exist, then His existence is necessary, which also seems true by definition. Therefore, God’s existence is either impossible or necessary. But God’s existence is only impossible if there is something contradictory in the concept of God, as a round square is contradictory and thus impossible. So if there is nothing contradictory in the concept of God, then His existence is necessary.
B. “The Five Ways” St. Thomas Aquinas
(1) Explain Aquinas’ argument for God’s existence that appeals to motion.
St. Thomas says the most manifest way is through motion (or change). Some things undergo motion, which is obvious to the senses. Water goes from hot to cold, alive to dead, small to large, green to orange, here to there, etc. Now everything that is moved is moved by another, since motion is the reduction of potentiality to actuality. This act is what effects motion. Something cannot go from potentiality to actuality except by something that is already in actuality for a thing cannot be both in potentiality and actuality in the same respect, as ice cannot be both potentially liquid and actually liquid. So the agent of motion, which is actuality, must be in something else, which means a thing cannot change itself. That is why whatever is moved is moved by another. But that other needs to be moved by yet another and this cannot go on into infinity because if it did, none of the others would effect motion. That would be like saying the chandelier is held up by the derivative power this link, which is held up by the derivative power of the link before it, ad infinitum. But if it did go back into infinity, there would be no derivative power to suspend the chandelier in the first place, but there it suspends (so there would have to be something like a ceiling which gives the power to the rest of the links). So there must be a first mover which depends and derives none of it’s actuality from anything else. It would be pure actuality. And this first mover, or pure actuality, all men call God.
(2) Explain Aquinas’ argument for God’s existence that appeals to causation.
St. Thomas says that there are efficient causes (and not just causes simpliciter, as St. Thomas distinguishes between many kinds of causes, like his use of Final Cause in the 5th Way). Now nothing is an efficient cause of it's own self because then it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. It is impossible to go on to infinity because in every order of efficient causes, the first produces the middle causes which produce the last. When a cause is removed, so is the effect. So if there were no first efficient cause, then there is no other cause. Now to be infinite means that there is no first, so there cannot be an infinite set of efficient causes. So there is an efficient first cause. This is all men call God.
(3) Be able to provide some critiques of these arguments that we discussed in class.
A classic critique is the gap problem, which states that even if such arguments succeed, they may not show that they demonstrate the kind of God St. Thomas thinks they do. How does one, for example, deduce that God is omnibenevolent from there being a first mover? Or how do we know such a God is omniscient? For if God were to lack these, then we probably aren’t concieving God, and the arguments don’t obviously provide or prove that the first cause or first mover has these essential attributes. It wouldn’t also be immediately obvious that it proves uniqueness, that is, why think that the God demonstrated in the arguments are all attributed to the one and same being, and not multiple beings? Because St. Thomas is trying to demonstrate the existence of a God of monotheism, such premises, if they are there, need to be fleshed out.
C. “The Cosmological Argument and The Principle of Sufficient Reason” William Rowe
(1) Explain the two parts to The Cosmological Argument.
The first part of the cosmological argument attempts to establish the existence of a necessary being. Necessary being here means that there is a being which carries the reason for it's existence within itself, or exists in all possible world, and not in only some but not all possible world. The second part of the cosmological argument attempts to establish that this necessary being is God.
(2) Explain the central premises in the first part of The Cosmological Argument.
The first central premises in the first part of the argument is that whatever exists is either a dependent or independent being, which is to say that things either things have the reason for their existence within it's own nature or within something else. And the second central premise is that it is false that every being is dependent.
(3) Explain the justification for the premise “It is false that every being is dependent.”
If we suppose that every being is dependent, then the collection of everything that exists must be infinite, which means that there is an infinite regress, and we cannot have an infinite regress because what explains the collection must either be inside or outside the collection. But if it lies within the collection, then we have potentially a circle. If Object 1 O1 is explained by O2, and O2 is explained by O3, and O3 is explained by O1, then this is circular. If we appeal to something outside the collection, then this violates the initial supposition that the “collection of all things” suddenly does not contain all things. So, from this, we think that it is false that every being is dependent.
(4) Explain the two versions of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) (What can be said in favor of the weaker version?) (Why is the stronger version contentious?) (Which version is a supposition of The Cosmological Argument?)
The two versions of the PSR are the weak version and the strong version. The weak version states that whatever exists must have an explanation of its existence. The weak version of the PSR states that whatever comes into existence must have an explanation of its existence. In support of the WPSR, suppose we come across a star and asked why it exists. Answering that it always has existed doesn’t come off as a doubtful answer. If however, we asked why did this star which came into being some time ago actually come to be, answering that it just did and that’s it doesn’t come off as a strong explanation. So the weak PSR does seem plausible for at least things we know are contingent. The stronger version of PSR is contentious because it doesn’t seem to be known a priori, that is to say, it doesn’t seem true by definition. It may be analytically true that every effect has a cause, but what is being claimed here is that every event has a cause, and that doesn’t seem to be analytically true. Further, Hume states that we can conceive of things existing without a cause or explanation, and because we can imagine it so, there is no necessary connection and no contradiction follows. The cosmological argument requires the SPSR, because the first premise states “whatever exists” which includes not just effects, but events as well.
D. “The Watch and the Watchmaker” William Paley
(1) Explain ‘The Design Argument’ (as presented by William Paley).
The design argument as presented by Paley is an argument from analogy. Suppose that you come across a pocket watch. If we were to inspect it and discover the intricacies of the watch and it's mechanisms, like the precise placings of the springs and cogs, we would infer that such an object was designed because all parts tend toward one result, and that this would require a maker. Likewise, when we look at nature and observe the intricacies there, we should likewise conclude that there is a designer and maker of nature.
E. “A Critique of the Design Argument” David Hume
(1) Explain the difference between Global vs Local Design Arguments
The local design arguments states that organisms are the product of intelligent design, the cell, or human eye. The global design arguments state that the universe is the product of intelligent design, such as the forces of nature being precisely as they are in order that life may exist.
(2) Explain what is required to establish that an argument from analogy is weak. (Be able to explain the Design Argument as an argument from analogy.) (Be able to justify whether the argument is (or is not) a weak analogy.)
In order to establish that an argument from analogy is weak, you need to establish that that objects in question are not sufficiently related. If the two objects are sufficiently related, then the argument is strong. In the case of the design argument, if objects in nature or the universe itself were sufficiently related to that of a watch, then the argument is a strong one. If objects in nature are not sufficiently related to that of a watch, then the argument is a weak one. I think when it comes to certain features of the world, the argument is a plausible one. I think it is difficult in principle to get information in DNA from purely natural processes. I also think the laws of nature, such as the force of gravity being precisely as it is in order for there to be chemistry are also difficult to explain in principle by purely natural forces. Other aspects, such as flagellums and planetary positions can be explained by nature, but these two, genetical information and the precise nature of natural laws such as gravity in particular cannot.
(3) Explain how The Argument from Design could be construed as an abductive argument.
An abductive argument is an inference to the best explanation. When we look at a watch, we can suppose that it is possible that the watch was created by an intelligent designer or that it was created by random events. Both could be plausible or implausible, but if we make an abductive inference, we choose the explanation which is better than the rest, which is a relative standard. So we look at the world, and can think that the best explanation for those intricacies are due to an intelligent design and a better explanation than random events.
F. “Arguments from Design” Richard Swinburne
(1) Explain Swinburne’s two ‘Arguments from Design’.
Swinburne’s first argument from temporal order states that throughout all time, material objects behave in the way commodified by laws. What are the most fundamental laws? This or that perhaps, but then what explains that? This observation cannot be explained by science, so either this observation is due to God or is some brute fact, that is to say, unexplainable. Swinburne’s argument from spatial order states that humans/animals are well organized, or that there is complexity in living things. You could appeal to evolution, but that only pushes the question back, since we could ask how does life necessary for evolution to take place at all arrive? This is the question of abiogenesis. Further, the laws of evolution themselves would need to be explained. So the complexity of life is ultimately due to God or is another brute fact. It seems as though positing God is the only explanation.
(2) Explain Swinburne’s ‘Appeal to Simplicity’ in defense of arguments from design.
Swinburne’s appeal to simplicity states that it postulates only one being, and not many. This is a virtue in appealing to theories as even scientists rest on this when they postulate that photons have zero rest mass rather than some very small rest mass, even though they would both do very well in making predictions, because that would just be simpler. God being infinitely powerful or infinitely anything else also counts towards simplicity because in some scientific theories, if you can postulate infinite degrees of properties consistently with the data, then that would also be simple. God, as a theory, has this virtue of simplicity.
The Problem of Evil
A. “Evil and Omnipotence” J.L. Mackie
(1) Explain the problem of evil.
The problem of evil states there is a contradiction within this set of statements: God is omnipotent, God is wholly good, and evil exists. Since God is omnibenevolent, God wishes to abolish evil, and since God is omnipotent, then God could abolish evil. If an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God exists, then evil does not exist. But since evil exists, then an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God does not exist.
(2) Explain the problems with the four fallacious solutions Mackie considers.
1. “Good cannot exist without evil” or “Evil is a necessary counterpart to good”
The main problem with this response is that it restricts God’s omnipotence, if not outright rejects it. If God and evil are necessary counterparts, then God cannot eliminate evil. This would also make “good” and “evil” similar to being “great” and “small”, but God is not typically understood in this relative sense. Couldn’t we think of God in an absolute and isolated sense? Further, why think that evil must be realized for there to be good?
2. “Evil is necessary as a means to good”
Again, this restricts God’s omnipotence. If evil is necessary as a means for good, this would make God subject to causal laws, which is tension with omnipotence and conflicts with the common notion that God creates causal laws.
3. “The universe is better with some evil in it than it could be if there were no evil.”
This reply can be understood aesthetically or progressively. The aesthetic understanding states that evil gives contrast or highlights goodness and beauty in the world. But it isn’t clear evil would be necessary to fully appreciate goodness and beauty in the world. The progressive version states that gradually overcoming evil makes for a better world. For example, there may be 1st order evils like pain and danger in order that there be 2nd order goods, like sympathy and heroism. The problem with this response is that it would qualify God’s omnibenevolence by making God more concerned about maximizing goods rather than minimizing evils. This would only make benevolence a derivative value. Further, this only pushes the question back a step. What then of 2nd order evils, like cruelty and malevolence? Supposing you could give an answer by appealing to 3rd order goods, then the problem simply arises again with 3rd order evils, ad infinitum. So a regress problem occurs.
4. “Evil is due to human free will”
This response shifts evil from being ascribed to God to being ascribed to man. Evil would be due to man's free choices, and freedom would be a 3rd order good. But if this is so, why couldn’t it be that God make every man freely choose good and not evil? Perhaps it may be said that it is impossible to make someone do something freely. Aside from limiting God’s omnipotence, this then this raises the question as to whether the will is a product of our characters or a product of chance. If it is due to our character, then why hasn’t God given us a better character? And if it is random, then it isn’t clear why freedom of the will is a good.
B. “The Inductive Argument from Evil against the Existence of God” William Rowe
(1) Explain Rowe’s version of the problem of evil.
Rowe’s version of the problem of evil is one that states that given the amount of gratuitous human and animal suffering, it is unlikely that God exists. There are instances of intense human and animal suffering that God could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil that is (at least) as bad. If God exists, God would prevent the intense human and animal suffering unless God could not do so without losing some greater good or preventing some evil that is at least as bad, so God does not exist. The amount of instances of 1 make the argument more plausible.
(2) Explain the ‘Fawn Scenario’ and its relevant features concerning the problem of evil.
The Fawn Scenario asks us to consider a fawn trapped in a fire who suffers greatly before dying. The suffering is not a product of human agency and easily preventable, but seemingly pointless, that is to say, not required to bring about a greater good. This is supposed to make it rational to believe the first premise of the argument, even if it doesn’t conclusively prove it.
(3) Explain the ‘G.E. Moore Shift’ as a response to the argument.
The G.E. Moore shift is taking a modus tollens of the argument. So if you had 1) A 2) If A then B 3) Therefore, B you could attack the argument either directly by attacking A or indirectly by demonstrating ~B. This latter indirect way is just a modus tollens. As it relates to the problem of evil, if the argument is set up (this is a simplistic version, and not exactly the version Rowe lays out) 1) Unnecessary evil exists 2) If unnecessary evil exists then God does not exist 3) Therefore God does not exist, then the G.E. Moore shift here would not be to attack the proposition that unnecessary evil exists but to show that God exists and is more likely or has an edge over the proposition that unnecessary evil exists.
(4) Explain the difference between unfriendly, indifferent, and friendly atheism.
Unfriendly atheism is the view that no one is rationally justified in believing God exists. Indifferent atheism is when one has no belief about the rationality of believing in God. Friendly atheism is the view that someone can believe there is a God and someone else believe there is not a God and have both people be rational.
C. “The Free Will Defense” Alvin Plantinga
(1) Explain the ‘free will defense’ in response to The Problem of Evil.
The free will defense in response to the problem of evil states that there is no contradiction between God’s omnipotence, benevolence, and the existence of evil so long as we add to that set of propositions “ It is possible that God could not have created a world containing moral good without creating one that also contained moral evil” and if that is possible, then God has a good reason for creating a world containing evil, and then the contradiction in the set of statements goes away, and so would the problem of evil.
(2) Explain how God’s omnipotence appears to create problems for the ‘free will defense’.
God’s omnipotence appears to create a problem for the free will defense when we consider that there is no contradiction or inconsistency in there being a world in which God creates where men are free but always freely choose good. In some possible world people act freely and always choose what is good, and if God can create any world, why not this one? This would be mean that the free will defense puts a limitation on God’s omnipotence.
(3) Explain Plantinga’s argument that there are some possible worlds that God could not create.
Plantinga argues that not every possible state of affairs is a possible world. It is an element of a possible world, but is not inclusive enough. A state of affairs A precludes a state of affairs B if it is not possible that both obtain (MJ being the GOAT precludes LeBron being the GOAT). A is a complete state of affairs if and only if for every state of affairs B, either A includes or precludes B. So a possible world is any possible state of affairs that is complete. Now God actualizes only one world. So in some possible world, (S^A) is true, and in another world (S^~A) is true, so when God actualizes a world, either A v ~A is true, but not A^~A. Suppose Maurice is considering what to eat for breakfast, and let S be the state of affairs that in the actual world include being free to eat oatmeal at T (A) and also being free to refrain from eating oatmeal at T (~A). Now God being omniscient knows either than when S’ obtains, Maurice will either freely choose A or ~A. But then this means that the kind of world that God can create is partly dependent on creatures free choice. If Maurice chooses A, then there is a world W1 God, though omnipotent, cannot create, W2. W1 and W2 are both possible worlds, but A is actually true, which means only W1 will be created. If God causes Maurice to choose ~A, then W2 does not obtain because S is denied where S contains freedom. From this, it is possible that God is omnipotent and it was not within His power to create a world containing moral good but no moral evil, and thus it is false that an omnipotent God could actualize any possible world.
D. “Must God Create the Best” Robert Adams (Posted Online)
(1) Explain the thesis that Adam’s defends in this paper, and why it requires rejecting Act Utilitarianism.
Adam’s thesis is that God could have created a world in which none of the creatures in it would exist in the BPW, those creatures have a life worth living (in a minimal sense) and they are at least as happy as they would have been in any possible world in which they could have existed. This is essentially a rejection of the proposition that God must create the BPW, and this proposition must be true if act utilitarianism is also true. So if Adam’s want to deny that God must create the BPW, then he must also reject act utilitarianism.
(2) Explain the problem with the contention that God wrongs creatures he chooses not to create.
The problem with this contention is that it doesn’t seem like God has an obligation to those who only possibly exist but don’t actually exist. This distinction is morally important since who a being who never exists is not wronged, and there can be no obligations to them. This is distinct from the probability of someone actually existing, which is greater than 0. Being merely logically possible doesn’t have the same moral weight and there is no obligation to bring them into existence either.
(3) Explain how God’s grace figures in an explanation of His creating a less-than-perfect world.
The concern with God not creating the best possible world is that it may seem to suggest that there is a kindness lacking within God. But this suffers from the defect of envy. Simply creating for love is sufficient grounds for creation. Grace is the disposition to love which is not dependent on the merit of the person loved, and not dependent on whether they exist in the best possible world. God’s graciousness in creation doesn’t imply the creatures he creates are the grounds for choosing to create them. We don’t praise God for His good judgment in creating us, but we consider His creating us as a personal favor. This grace is part of God’s perfect goodness. If that is the case, there is nothing that obligates God to create the BPW.
(4) Explain the Counterexample, i.e., ‘Case A’, that Adam’s considers to his argument. (And, be able to supply his rejoinder to this counterexample.)
The counterexample asks us to consider a person who conceives a child then damages it by giving him a shot. They may love the child dearly, and the child on the whole may be happy, but the parents have clearly wronged the child. And so it goes with God who doesn’t create the best possible world. Adam’s rejoinders that it is wrong for human beings to cause, knowingly and voluntarily, the procreation of an offspring of human parents which is notably deficient by comparison with a normal human being in mental or physical capacity. This would not be arbitrary under Christianity. God created us with an intent, and we must act in accord to that end. To go against that would go against God.
Part II – Arguments for God’s Existence
A. “St. Anselm’s Ontological Argument” Norman Malcolm
(1) Explain Anslem’s Ontological Argument for God’s existence.
God is that which a greater cannot be conceived. Whatever it is that God is, it isn’t possible to concieve of something greater. Now, something a greater than which cannot be conceived exists in the understanding. Many, if not most, atheists would agree with this definition, even if they reject that it actually exists. They have know what it is they are rejecting. To exist in reality is greater than to exist in the understanding alone. For example, the idea of having a million dollars isn’t as great as also actually having those million dollars. So having being is greater than just being an idea. If God exists in the understanding alone, then God would not be that than which a greater cannot be conceived, since I could conceive of a God that also exists and that would be greater. Thus God exists in reality as well as the understanding. And this is just to say God actually exists.
(2) Explain the Existence-is-not-a-property Objection and the Lost Island Objection.
The existence-is-not-a-property objection states that predicating existence to a thing doesn’t add anything to out knowledge of the thing. So if I were to compare two butlers, and each had a set of properties, such as being disciplined and on time, these tell me things about the butler. But if I were to say that this butler exists and that one does not, I don’t seem to add anything to my knowledge about those butlers. So existence isn’t a property. The Lost Island objection attempts to parody the ontological argument by substituting “God” with “Lost Island” and then have the Lost Island be defined as the island which a greater cannot be conceived. And if that argument runs through, then you could replace “God” with anything else and thus prove that it exists, which is absurd.
(3) Explain Anselm’s Ontological Argument for God’s necessary existence.
Anselm’s 2nd argument argues that God is either necessary or impossible. God either does or does not exist. God cannot come into existence, because if He did, then He would be a limited or finite being, which is not what we think of God as. If God does not exist and God cannot come into existence, then God’s existence is impossible, which seems true by definition. If God does exist, then he cannot come into existence, or cease to exist, for this too would make God a finite or limited being, which God is not. But if God exists and cannot come into existence or cease to exist, then His existence is necessary, which also seems true by definition. Therefore, God’s existence is either impossible or necessary. But God’s existence is only impossible if there is something contradictory in the concept of God, as a round square is contradictory and thus impossible. So if there is nothing contradictory in the concept of God, then His existence is necessary.
B. “The Five Ways” St. Thomas Aquinas
(1) Explain Aquinas’ argument for God’s existence that appeals to motion.
St. Thomas says the most manifest way is through motion (or change). Some things undergo motion, which is obvious to the senses. Water goes from hot to cold, alive to dead, small to large, green to orange, here to there, etc. Now everything that is moved is moved by another, since motion is the reduction of potentiality to actuality. This act is what effects motion. Something cannot go from potentiality to actuality except by something that is already in actuality for a thing cannot be both in potentiality and actuality in the same respect, as ice cannot be both potentially liquid and actually liquid. So the agent of motion, which is actuality, must be in something else, which means a thing cannot change itself. That is why whatever is moved is moved by another. But that other needs to be moved by yet another and this cannot go on into infinity because if it did, none of the others would effect motion. That would be like saying the chandelier is held up by the derivative power this link, which is held up by the derivative power of the link before it, ad infinitum. But if it did go back into infinity, there would be no derivative power to suspend the chandelier in the first place, but there it suspends (so there would have to be something like a ceiling which gives the power to the rest of the links). So there must be a first mover which depends and derives none of it’s actuality from anything else. It would be pure actuality. And this first mover, or pure actuality, all men call God.
(2) Explain Aquinas’ argument for God’s existence that appeals to causation.
St. Thomas says that there are efficient causes (and not just causes simpliciter, as St. Thomas distinguishes between many kinds of causes, like his use of Final Cause in the 5th Way). Now nothing is an efficient cause of it's own self because then it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. It is impossible to go on to infinity because in every order of efficient causes, the first produces the middle causes which produce the last. When a cause is removed, so is the effect. So if there were no first efficient cause, then there is no other cause. Now to be infinite means that there is no first, so there cannot be an infinite set of efficient causes. So there is an efficient first cause. This is all men call God.
(3) Be able to provide some critiques of these arguments that we discussed in class.
A classic critique is the gap problem, which states that even if such arguments succeed, they may not show that they demonstrate the kind of God St. Thomas thinks they do. How does one, for example, deduce that God is omnibenevolent from there being a first mover? Or how do we know such a God is omniscient? For if God were to lack these, then we probably aren’t concieving God, and the arguments don’t obviously provide or prove that the first cause or first mover has these essential attributes. It wouldn’t also be immediately obvious that it proves uniqueness, that is, why think that the God demonstrated in the arguments are all attributed to the one and same being, and not multiple beings? Because St. Thomas is trying to demonstrate the existence of a God of monotheism, such premises, if they are there, need to be fleshed out.
C. “The Cosmological Argument and The Principle of Sufficient Reason” William Rowe
(1) Explain the two parts to The Cosmological Argument.
The first part of the cosmological argument attempts to establish the existence of a necessary being. Necessary being here means that there is a being which carries the reason for it's existence within itself, or exists in all possible world, and not in only some but not all possible world. The second part of the cosmological argument attempts to establish that this necessary being is God.
(2) Explain the central premises in the first part of The Cosmological Argument.
The first central premises in the first part of the argument is that whatever exists is either a dependent or independent being, which is to say that things either things have the reason for their existence within it's own nature or within something else. And the second central premise is that it is false that every being is dependent.
(3) Explain the justification for the premise “It is false that every being is dependent.”
If we suppose that every being is dependent, then the collection of everything that exists must be infinite, which means that there is an infinite regress, and we cannot have an infinite regress because what explains the collection must either be inside or outside the collection. But if it lies within the collection, then we have potentially a circle. If Object 1 O1 is explained by O2, and O2 is explained by O3, and O3 is explained by O1, then this is circular. If we appeal to something outside the collection, then this violates the initial supposition that the “collection of all things” suddenly does not contain all things. So, from this, we think that it is false that every being is dependent.
(4) Explain the two versions of the Principle of Sufficient Reason (PSR) (What can be said in favor of the weaker version?) (Why is the stronger version contentious?) (Which version is a supposition of The Cosmological Argument?)
The two versions of the PSR are the weak version and the strong version. The weak version states that whatever exists must have an explanation of its existence. The weak version of the PSR states that whatever comes into existence must have an explanation of its existence. In support of the WPSR, suppose we come across a star and asked why it exists. Answering that it always has existed doesn’t come off as a doubtful answer. If however, we asked why did this star which came into being some time ago actually come to be, answering that it just did and that’s it doesn’t come off as a strong explanation. So the weak PSR does seem plausible for at least things we know are contingent. The stronger version of PSR is contentious because it doesn’t seem to be known a priori, that is to say, it doesn’t seem true by definition. It may be analytically true that every effect has a cause, but what is being claimed here is that every event has a cause, and that doesn’t seem to be analytically true. Further, Hume states that we can conceive of things existing without a cause or explanation, and because we can imagine it so, there is no necessary connection and no contradiction follows. The cosmological argument requires the SPSR, because the first premise states “whatever exists” which includes not just effects, but events as well.
D. “The Watch and the Watchmaker” William Paley
(1) Explain ‘The Design Argument’ (as presented by William Paley).
The design argument as presented by Paley is an argument from analogy. Suppose that you come across a pocket watch. If we were to inspect it and discover the intricacies of the watch and it's mechanisms, like the precise placings of the springs and cogs, we would infer that such an object was designed because all parts tend toward one result, and that this would require a maker. Likewise, when we look at nature and observe the intricacies there, we should likewise conclude that there is a designer and maker of nature.
E. “A Critique of the Design Argument” David Hume
(1) Explain the difference between Global vs Local Design Arguments
The local design arguments states that organisms are the product of intelligent design, the cell, or human eye. The global design arguments state that the universe is the product of intelligent design, such as the forces of nature being precisely as they are in order that life may exist.
(2) Explain what is required to establish that an argument from analogy is weak. (Be able to explain the Design Argument as an argument from analogy.) (Be able to justify whether the argument is (or is not) a weak analogy.)
In order to establish that an argument from analogy is weak, you need to establish that that objects in question are not sufficiently related. If the two objects are sufficiently related, then the argument is strong. In the case of the design argument, if objects in nature or the universe itself were sufficiently related to that of a watch, then the argument is a strong one. If objects in nature are not sufficiently related to that of a watch, then the argument is a weak one. I think when it comes to certain features of the world, the argument is a plausible one. I think it is difficult in principle to get information in DNA from purely natural processes. I also think the laws of nature, such as the force of gravity being precisely as it is in order for there to be chemistry are also difficult to explain in principle by purely natural forces. Other aspects, such as flagellums and planetary positions can be explained by nature, but these two, genetical information and the precise nature of natural laws such as gravity in particular cannot.
(3) Explain how The Argument from Design could be construed as an abductive argument.
An abductive argument is an inference to the best explanation. When we look at a watch, we can suppose that it is possible that the watch was created by an intelligent designer or that it was created by random events. Both could be plausible or implausible, but if we make an abductive inference, we choose the explanation which is better than the rest, which is a relative standard. So we look at the world, and can think that the best explanation for those intricacies are due to an intelligent design and a better explanation than random events.
F. “Arguments from Design” Richard Swinburne
(1) Explain Swinburne’s two ‘Arguments from Design’.
Swinburne’s first argument from temporal order states that throughout all time, material objects behave in the way commodified by laws. What are the most fundamental laws? This or that perhaps, but then what explains that? This observation cannot be explained by science, so either this observation is due to God or is some brute fact, that is to say, unexplainable. Swinburne’s argument from spatial order states that humans/animals are well organized, or that there is complexity in living things. You could appeal to evolution, but that only pushes the question back, since we could ask how does life necessary for evolution to take place at all arrive? This is the question of abiogenesis. Further, the laws of evolution themselves would need to be explained. So the complexity of life is ultimately due to God or is another brute fact. It seems as though positing God is the only explanation.
(2) Explain Swinburne’s ‘Appeal to Simplicity’ in defense of arguments from design.
Swinburne’s appeal to simplicity states that it postulates only one being, and not many. This is a virtue in appealing to theories as even scientists rest on this when they postulate that photons have zero rest mass rather than some very small rest mass, even though they would both do very well in making predictions, because that would just be simpler. God being infinitely powerful or infinitely anything else also counts towards simplicity because in some scientific theories, if you can postulate infinite degrees of properties consistently with the data, then that would also be simple. God, as a theory, has this virtue of simplicity.
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