What Kind of Aristotelian Substances Are There?
The following is an essay I had to write for class. Footnotes could not be copied over.
Basing yourself on Metaphysics Book VIII, Chapter 2 and Meteorology Book IV, Chapter 12 write a concise account of what sorts of things you believe count as Aristotelian substances. Again, I encourage you to draw from other things we have read by Aristotle (for example the material from Physics Book II and On The Soul Book II), if you find it useful to do so.
I think the sorts of things that count as Aristotelian substances include anything composed with matter. As Aristotle states, matter is a kind of differentiae, and anything with differentiae is, for if it were not, it wouldn’t be differentiating anything to begin with. So, humans, cats, grass, gold, these types of things are Aristotlean substances. I don’t think artefacts, though they have matter in a certain sense, would count as Aristotlean substances because they don’t have an essence, or form. As Aristotle says, what a thing is is determined by its function. They are what they are in virtue of a power or action that they have or perform. Now powers and actions are predicated to a things form, and powers coming from a things form are internal. No power in a considered artefact is considered to be internal. It is always externally imposed. So, no artefact has a proper function, and is thus not properly a thing. They would be a thing only in a nominal sense, not an Aristotelean sense. So things like cars, scissors, computers, buildings, clothes, and the like don't count as Aristotelian substances.
I also think non-material things, like angels and intermediary humans, count as Aristotelian substances as well. Aristotle says that essence is pure definition. I think it’s a mistake to say what instantiates essence is matter, for that would make matter identical to existence, which I think is counter-intuitive. So, there’s a distinction between essence and existence. Angels have a definition, but have no matter, but do have existence. And so long as they have a definition, and powers and an end, that is actualized by existence, then they count as Aristotelian substances. Now, matter is what differentiates, and since angels have no matter, what follows is that no angel is like another in a radical sense. The title angel is just a name, and does not refer to anything about their nature.
Intermediary humans, or humans who have died but have not yet been resurrected, would also count as Aristotelian substances. So the essence of a human is a rational animal. The rational soul is the form of the bodily animal. It may be tempting to think that once you have separated the form from the matter, you have annihilated the substance. But as Aristotle says, the hand of a dead man is a hand in name only. So we can ask here why is the hand no longer a substance and not the rest of the body? Presumably because the hand had been separated from the animating principle. So, if we maintain the animating principle, we maintain the substance. When the person dies and his soul is separated from the body, the soul, or animating principle, still remains. Granted it is incomplete, but so is the human an incomplete substance when his hand is cut off. Incomplete substances are not non-substances. Intermediary humans would then just radically incomplete Aristotelian substances, but still substances.
Basing yourself on Metaphysics Book VIII, Chapter 2 and Meteorology Book IV, Chapter 12 write a concise account of what sorts of things you believe count as Aristotelian substances. Again, I encourage you to draw from other things we have read by Aristotle (for example the material from Physics Book II and On The Soul Book II), if you find it useful to do so.
I think the sorts of things that count as Aristotelian substances include anything composed with matter. As Aristotle states, matter is a kind of differentiae, and anything with differentiae is, for if it were not, it wouldn’t be differentiating anything to begin with. So, humans, cats, grass, gold, these types of things are Aristotlean substances. I don’t think artefacts, though they have matter in a certain sense, would count as Aristotlean substances because they don’t have an essence, or form. As Aristotle says, what a thing is is determined by its function. They are what they are in virtue of a power or action that they have or perform. Now powers and actions are predicated to a things form, and powers coming from a things form are internal. No power in a considered artefact is considered to be internal. It is always externally imposed. So, no artefact has a proper function, and is thus not properly a thing. They would be a thing only in a nominal sense, not an Aristotelean sense. So things like cars, scissors, computers, buildings, clothes, and the like don't count as Aristotelian substances.
I also think non-material things, like angels and intermediary humans, count as Aristotelian substances as well. Aristotle says that essence is pure definition. I think it’s a mistake to say what instantiates essence is matter, for that would make matter identical to existence, which I think is counter-intuitive. So, there’s a distinction between essence and existence. Angels have a definition, but have no matter, but do have existence. And so long as they have a definition, and powers and an end, that is actualized by existence, then they count as Aristotelian substances. Now, matter is what differentiates, and since angels have no matter, what follows is that no angel is like another in a radical sense. The title angel is just a name, and does not refer to anything about their nature.
Intermediary humans, or humans who have died but have not yet been resurrected, would also count as Aristotelian substances. So the essence of a human is a rational animal. The rational soul is the form of the bodily animal. It may be tempting to think that once you have separated the form from the matter, you have annihilated the substance. But as Aristotle says, the hand of a dead man is a hand in name only. So we can ask here why is the hand no longer a substance and not the rest of the body? Presumably because the hand had been separated from the animating principle. So, if we maintain the animating principle, we maintain the substance. When the person dies and his soul is separated from the body, the soul, or animating principle, still remains. Granted it is incomplete, but so is the human an incomplete substance when his hand is cut off. Incomplete substances are not non-substances. Intermediary humans would then just radically incomplete Aristotelian substances, but still substances.
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